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Crisis Culture in India’s 
National Security*
Deepak Kapoor
Two major aspects bedevil our approach to national security. In fact, they 
are not only relevant to national security but almost to all other spheres 
of our functioning as a nation.
Of which, first, is the aspect of being reactive to emerging situations. A 
peep into history would show that from time to time, series of raiders and 
marauding hordes have descended on our land, plundered it, occupied it 
and ruled over it. Starting from Alexander to Mohammad Ghazani, the 
Portuguese, the Mughals, the British and even the Chinese have occupied 
different parts of India. However, during the same period, we do not 
find many instances of our indigenous rulers going outwards to capture 
or rule over distant lands. In fact, even while trying to defend our land 
against incoming adversaries, India’s actions have been reactive in nature 
rather than proactive or offensive.
Such a characteristic of India may be ascribed to its peaceful and 
non-aggressive nature. Wherein, the belief is pledged on peaceful co-
existence rather than covet others’ territory or possessions. However, 
it does place India at the receiving end most of the time when dealing 
with aggressors. More importantly, it does not bode well for India’s 
national security in a global environment; wherein, territorial integrity 
remains sacrosanct.
General Deepak Kapoor (Retd) is the former Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army.
*This article is the revised version of the paper published in the CLAWS Website titled “Crisis 
Culture in National Security” on 28 August 2020.























Even post-independence, the culture of being reactive has stayed 
with India, leaving it in a relatively disadvantageous situation of trying 
to restore status-quo-ante at great cost and effort. In 1948, 1965 and 
1999, Pakistan initiated aggression against India. To which, India reacted 
with aggression and fought back to regain its lost territories. In 1971, 
Pakistan carried out pre-emptive air strikes on India in the morning of 
December 3, despite the expectation worldwide that India would initiate 
an action to set right the wrongs committed on the hapless population of 
Bangladesh, by attacking Pakistan. 
In 1962, China’s aggression found India totally surprised and 
unprepared, resulting in a defeat for India. Having achieved its objectives, 
the Chinese retreated. Since April/May 2020, India has been exposed to 
Chinese expansionism in Eastern Ladakh and is still trying to convince 
them to restore status-quo-ante and go back. 
In most of the above cases against Pakistan, it was the grit and 
determination of the Indian soldier that saved the day and gave India ‘victory’ 
despite following a reactive philosophy. In 1962, while Indian soldiers fought 
valiantly against the Chinese, the odds were too heavily stacked against them 
to change the outcome decisively. In contrast, the encounter at Galwan on 
15 June 2020, has amply highlighted what Indian soldiers are capable of 
achieving, if they are provided with the requisite wherewithal.
The second worrisome aspect, partially related to the first one, is 
India’s tendency to react only when there is a cris s. In fact, this habit 
seems to be embedded in every sphere of its functioning. How else can 
one explain the massive traffic woes in India’s urban conglomerates while 
the infrastructure is always trying to catch up or the hazardous pollution 
caused all over North India by burning of wheat crop stumps annually 
with a solution still not in sight? 
In the realm of national security, why must only a strike by Pakistan-
trained terrorists at Uri or Pulwama galvanise India into action, when 
terrorist attacks on security forces are taking place on a daily basis. To 
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stop proxy war in J&K by Pakistan, it is just not enough to launch an odd 
trans-border strike like Balakot every couple of years. There has to be a 
continuous pro-active approach for the adversary to realise the costs of 
supporting a proxy war, thus deter it from doing so. 
Coming to Eastern Ladakh, India’s intelligence agencies should 
have picked up aggressive Chinese movements and massing of additional 
formations well in time—given nothing can happen overnight in Ladakh, 
with the necessity to go through acclimatisation lasting weeks. The other 
possibility that India ignored was timely warnings of Chinese build up, 
which is more worrisome! The need to reinforce weakly held positions 
in Eastern Ladakh knowing well the Chinese propensity to indulge in 
salami-slicing was overwhelming, the moment their movements were 
discovered. 
The problem with decisions taken during crises is that they are taken 
in a hurry with the specific aim of getting over the crisis. They tend to 
ignore the long-term perspective besides being expensive. In matters 
of national security, it is important to foresee emerging situations and 
have plans ready to tackle them. As noted, in 2008-09, India envisaged 
a two-front threat and sought approval for raising four divisions, which 
the government agreed to. Of these, two were raised in 2010 and the rest 
came later in the form of Mountain Strike Corps, which is now proving 
to be of great relevance.
The global reality is that the rise of a nation will always be opposed by 
the others. For instance, Germany rose twice only to be defeated during 
the two world wars. While during the rise of China in the 1980s and 
1990s, Deng Xiaoping’s advice ‘hide your capabilities, bide your time’ 
held China in good stead. Having become powerful, it now feels strong 
enough to indulge in expansionism not only towards its western borders 
but also in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.
It is important to note that a developing nation needs to be 
economically strong before it can allocate adequate resources to become 
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militarily capable. A fine balance has to be ensured between national 
security and economic progress while moving forward. COVID-19 has 
definitely put brakes on the economic progress and it would take time to 
recover from it fully. However, in view of the emerging situation along 
the India-China border, there is no choice but to rush for emergent 
imports. This was avoidable if India had allocated a larger percentage of 
GDP to ‘Defence’ in the past. 
While initiatives such as Atmanirbhar Bharat and “Vocal for Local” 
are indeed excellent for developing a strong India, however, in defence 
production and induction of the weaponry into the services, a gestation 
period of at least 10-15 years is required. Besides, “Make in India” 
initiative, which commenced in 2014 has not been able to show much 
progress until now. To note, self-sufficiency in defence production is 
achievable only if the private sector is brought in to this field, in addition 
to the existing public sector undertakings (PSU). The private sector would 
also require deep pockets to incur heavy expenditure over a prolonged 
period before expecting any returns to flow in. 
Current record of accomplishments of our Defence Research and 
Development Organisation (DRDO) and PSUs, including Ordnance 
Factory Board (OFB) does not enthuse much confidence. India’s thriving 
private sector needs to be incorporated not only in the field of defence 
production but also in futuristic areas like artificial intelligence, cyber, space, 
and information technology. Frequent changes in Defence Production 
Policy (DPP), almost on an annual basis, have acted as a major dampener. 
The new policy, in its new avatar as the Defence Acquisition Policy (DAP) 
2020, is expected shortly and would hopefully address all major concerns. 
The DRDO has to play an important positive role in encouraging and 
guiding aspiring entrants from the private sector by imparting technical 
knowhow until such joint projects become commercially viable. 
The Chinese expansionism is now forcing India to rapidly develop 
its border infrastructure, which is in a comparatively poor state to that 
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of the Chinese on their side in Tibet. Strategic roads that India started 
working on in the beginning of the millennium are yet to be completed. 
Road construction in border regions is expensive and a time-consuming 
process. Thereby, to hasten it, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) 
needs to be allocated additional funds as well as state-of-the-art road 
construction equipment.
Furthermore, in some forward areas, road construction activity is 
delayed due to lack of environmental clearances. For instance, in Sikkim, the 
state government’s action of designating Pangolakha Wild Life Sanctuary 
and Kanchanjunga National Park in the forward areas has resulted into a 
ban on any road construction without environmental clearances, which 
at times takes years to be granted. In addition, India’s judicial system 
too needs to be responsive to national security requirements, which are 
focused primarily to serve the national interest.
And finally, the necessity of increasing the defence budget to at least 
3 per cent of the GDP has been highlighted to successive governments by 
various committees and the military from time to time. Even after project 
Atmanirbhar Bharat is fully implemented, this level of expenditure would 
be needed to maintain a military relevant to growing national aspirations. 
The Chinese ‘official’ expenditure on military has been approximately 
four times that of India for the last two decades, while the Pakistan 
military, of course, takes as much as it requires from the national reserve. 
In the current geo-political environment, the territorial integrity of 
the nation is of paramount importance. The onus of defending it falls 
squarely on the military. The Indian soldier has repeatedly demonstrated 
his fighting capabilities successfully in snatching victory from the jaws of 
defeat at tremendous personal cost. Nevertheless, the nation needs to 
provide him with the necessary wherewithal in order to perform to his 
potential. 
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